Brokerage and balance: Creating an effective organizational interface for product modularization in multinational R&amp;D by Liu, Y et al.
 
 
Brokerage and Balance: Creating an Effective Organizational Interface for 
Product Modularization in Multinational R&D 
 
 
 
Yang Liu * 
Management School 
Queen’s University Belfast 
Riddel Hall, 185 Stranmillis Road 
Belfast, BT9 5EE, UK 
yang_liu2011@yahoo.com 
 
 
Xingkun Liang 
Department of Information Management 
Peking University 
5 Yiheyuan Road 
Beijing, 100871, China 
lxk@pku.edu.cn 
 
 
Yongjiang Shi 
Institute for Manufacturing 
University of Cambridge 
17 Charles Babbage Road 
Cambridge, CB3 0FS, UK 
ys@eng.cam.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Corresponding author. 
 
 
1 
 
Brokerage and Balance: Creating an Effective Organizational Interface for 
Product Modularization in Multinational R&D 
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite numerous studies on modularity, the modularization processes have received less 
attention. In the global context, product modularity can be leveraged to satisfy heterogeneous 
market requirements across countries with low costs. Through a longitudinal case study of 
HomeTech, we examined how multinational R&D created an effective organizational 
interface to facilitate recombination of its organizational units, and thus product 
modularization. We found that three elements of an organizational interface were established 
through a process composed of three phases in HomeTech R&D: regional concentration, 
establishing a module pool, and creating architecture leader posts. We also found that the 
three elements exerted the balancing effect and the brokerage effect so that the organizational 
interface was effective in facilitating recombination of organizational units. We contribute to 
the literature through showing how organizational modularity can affect product modularity 
within a firm. We also reveal the critical role of architecture leaders in product 
modularization. Finally, we enrich the organizational interface concept by highlighting the 
combination of elements. 
 
Keywords: modularization, organizational interface, new product development, 
multinational corporations, mirroring hypothesis 
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1. Introduction 
Product modularity has received considerable attention over the years (Baldwin and 
Clark, 1997; Fixson, 2005; Lau et al., 2011). One important benefit of product modularity is 
that it can provide product variety for heterogeneous market requirements with component 
commonality (Robertson and Ulrich, 1998; Ulrich, 1995). While modularity-as-property and 
modularization-as-process have been clearly differentiated (MacDuffie, 2013), prior studies 
have mainly focused on modularity-as-property from a rather static perspective (Fixson, 2005; 
Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Zeschky et al., 2014). The product modularization process – 
how product designs evolve towards higher modularity and the related organizational 
dynamics – within a firm has received less attention. In many industries, there is no industrial 
standard for the designs of physical interfaces of components, the benefit being freedom to 
experiment with product designs without the constraint of the standards (Baldwin and Clark, 
1997). In such industries, many firms conduct intra-firm product modularization for 
competitiveness (Gunzenhauser and Bongulielmi, 2008; Li et al., 2013), but it is quite 
challenging due to compatibility and coordination issues (MacDuffie, 2013). 
Studies have acknowledged the relationship between product modularity and 
organizational modularity, which is referred to as the mirroring hypothesis (Hoetker, 2006). 
The predominant argument in this area is that products design organizations – modular 
products lead to modular organizations (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Sanchez and Mahoney, 
1996). However, research also indicates that organizations may design products under certain 
conditions (Gunzenhauser and Bongulielmi, 2008), which sheds some light on intra-firm 
product modularization. Through achieving organizational modularity of R&D with 
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recombination of (loosely coupled) organizational units, physical interfaces can be decoupled 
and modules made compatible with each other (MacCormack et al., 2012). Such 
recombination (loose-coupling) of organizational units needs to be facilitated by an effective 
organizational interface providing opportunities for collaboration (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 
2010). However, prior studies could not fully explain this relationship – how an effective 
organizational interface could facilitate organizational modularization and thus product 
modularization. A (dynamic) process view is also missing, which hinders our understanding. 
We define ‘organizational interface’ as the media or platform (with certain protocols) 
through which organizational units with boundaries can connect, interact, and coordinate with 
each other (Brown, 1983; Moenaert and Souder, 1996; Raes et al., 2011). An organizational 
interface, including tangible and intangible aspects, can be designed to promote interaction 
and coordination (Brown, 1983). Previous studies have suggested possible elements of an 
organizational interface, such as forums, electronic databases, and procedures for information 
exchange (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010). However, these studies have not analyzed the 
combination of elements – the minimum set of elements needed and the sequence of 
establishing these elements – for creating an effective organizational interface. The 
combination of elements of an organizational interface can possibly influence organizational 
modularization and thus product modularization, which needs investigation. 
This study explores the process of creating an organizational interface for product 
modularization in the context of globally dispersed R&D centers in a multinational 
corporation (MNC). Multinational R&D is an ideal context for exploring the organizational 
interface for product modularization for three reasons. First, multinational R&D needs to 
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meet heterogeneous market conditions across countries, calling for product modularization 
(Gunzenhauser and Bongulielmi, 2008; Zeschky et al., 2014). Secondly, dispersed R&D 
centers and their engineering teams/units (for product components) have clear geographic and 
functional boundaries, so they may have different objectives, tasks, and habits (Birkinshaw 
and Morrison, 1995; Mäkelä et al., 2012). Creating an effective organizational interface is 
challenging but has great potential benefits in this context. Thirdly, previous studies have 
indicated that one important issue in designing an organizational interface is centralization vs. 
decentralization (Lei et al., 1996; Wren, 1967). Likewise, centralization-decentralization is 
important to R&D centers of MNCs, affecting innovation capabilities (Chen et al., 2012; 
Gassmann and von Zedwitz, 1999). 
To fill the research gaps identified above, we set the following research question: How 
could multinational R&D create an effective organizational interface to facilitate product 
modularization (to satisfy heterogeneous requirements across countries)? To be specific, we 
aim to examine the process of creating an organizational interface; the key elements; the 
sequence of creating them; their contributions to the effectiveness of the organizational 
interface for product modularization. Through a longitudinal case study of HomeTech, we 
identified a three-phase process creating three key elements of an organizational interface, 
and we analyzed the effect(s) of each element. 
Our findings make three important contributions. First, we advance our understanding of 
the mirroring hypothesis through a dynamic view showing how organizations could design 
products. Second, we show the critical role of architecture leaders (ALs) in product 
modularization. Finally, we enrich the concept of organizational interface by highlighting the 
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combination of elements which have not been analyzed in prior studies. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Product Modularity and Modularization 
Product modularity is defined by Ulrich (1995) as a one-to-one mapping from functions 
to components and decoupled interfaces. Modular products are decomposable into modules 
(Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Ulrich, 1995) and these modules are interchangeable, 
which enables mixing-and-matching to build different product variants (Baldwin and Clark, 
1997; Schilling, 2000). Modularity can be the open type (industry-level) or the closed type 
(firm-level) (Fujimoto, 2007; Pil and Cohen, 2006). 
Studies on product modularity are abundant. However, most of these studies are static in 
nature, exploring the antecedents and consequences of product modularity at the firm or 
industry level (Pil and Cohen, 2006; Schilling, 2000; Worren et al., 2002). As a consequence 
of the static perspective, many studies have used ‘modularity’ and ‘modularization’ almost 
interchangeably (Brun and Zorzini, 2009; Doran, 2003; Kotabe et al., 2007; McDermott et al., 
2013). MacDuffie (2013) clearly differentiated the two as modularity-as-property and 
modularization-as-process. The former refers to the design property and the latter reflects a 
process-based view – how product designs evolve towards higher modularity. 
Scholars have identified the importance of understanding the product modularization 
process. Its complexity lies in the contingencies that can influence the level of product 
modularity during the process (MacDuffie, 2013; Schilling, 2000). It is quite challenging as it 
involves not only technical factors, but also organizational factors, such as interactions 
between different organizational units (Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Persson and Åhlström, 
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2006). When decoupling physical interfaces, engineers (working as organizational units) in 
R&D centers need to understand cross-module interdependencies (Fixson, 2005; MacDuffie, 
2013). Coordination and communication are likely to affect the interchangeability or 
compatibility of product modules (MacDuffie, 2013). However, despite their importance, 
very few studies have revealed the organizational dynamics and efforts that facilitate product 
modularization. 
While focusing on the effect of the modularity property (i.e. what will happen after a 
certain level of product modularity is achieved), some studies have shown how clearly 
defined physical interfaces between modules can serve as an embedded coordination 
mechanism that reduces the coordination cost for organizational units of R&D (Tiwana, 2008; 
Zeschky et al., 2014). However, this stream of studies has also indicated that physical 
interfaces – if not defined by industrial standards – can change over time within firms (Kar et 
al., 2009; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996), which requires coordination between organizational 
units of R&D to realize high product variety and module interchangeability when designing 
physical interfaces (MacDuffie, 2013). Such flexibility of physical interfaces is desirable as it 
offers freedom to experiment with product designs for innovation (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; 
Pil and Cohen, 2006). Therefore, a process view of product modularization is needed to 
advance our understanding of how the interchangeability of modules can be progressively 
enhanced as a result of certain organizational changes within firms. 
2.2. Product and Organizational Modularity 
Studies of the mirroring hypothesis suggest that modular products lead to modular 
(loosely-coupled) organizations (Hoetker, 2006; Karim, 2006). With clearly defined product 
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modules and decoupled physical interfaces, organizational units of R&D are loosely coupled 
allowing concurrent and autonomous activities of designing modules (Cabigiosu and 
Camuffo, 2012; Furlan et al., 2014; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). 
However, some studies also indicate that the opposite direction of the effect – modular 
organizations lead to modular products – may happen when physical interfaces are not 
defined by industrial standards. Modular (loosely coupled) organizations are characterized by 
recombination or reconfigurability of organizational units (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; 
Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Schilling and Steensma, 2001). This provides favorable 
conditions for decoupling physical interfaces when designing modular products 
(MacCormack et al., 2012; MacDuffie, 2013). Recombination of organizational units of R&D 
allows engineers to better address cross-module interdependencies and increase module 
interchangeability or compatibility through communication (MacDuffie, 2013). However, we 
still have limited knowledge regarding how recombination of organizational units of R&D – 
with geographic and functional boundaries (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; MacCormack et 
al., 2012) – can be promoted over time. A (dynamic) process view could advance our 
understanding of how to facilitate product modularization through organizational 
modularization over time. 
2.3. Organizational Interface 
Organizational interface can be conceptualized broadly as a place where separate worlds 
intersect (Raes et al., 2011). Organizational units are separate worlds because they have 
functional or geographic boundaries (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995), and each of them has 
its own interests, activities, and habits (Wren, 1967). However, organizational units can 
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potentially be connected in some ways (e.g. working with each other) due to task 
interdependencies in achieving collective or common interests (Andersson and Pedersen, 
2010; Wren, 1967). An organizational interface needs to be well designed to promote 
communication and coordination between organizational units. Organizational interface can 
also be conceptualized narrowly as the media or platform for communication between 
organizational units (Jansen et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2005; Moenaert and Souder, 1996). In 
support of this, Lei et al. (1996) explored how software systems facilitate communication. 
Raes et al. (2011) also offered examples of phone calls and written communication as the 
media. 
Through refining previous conceptualizations, we define ‘organizational interface’ as the 
media or platform with certain protocols to facilitate communication, interaction, and 
coordination across organizational units with boundaries. Designing an organizational 
interface includes both the tangible aspect (e.g. tools and people) and the intangible aspect 
(i.e. protocols of using it) (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Jansen et al., 2005). Protocols 
(also called regulatory mechanisms) can specify what organizational units should use the 
media or platform, when and how to use them for communication, and the objectives of 
communication. Protocols could influence the relationships between organizational units such 
as the reporting structure and the decision-making power, because protocols can shape 
expectations of units (Brown, 1983). 
An organizational interface can have different formats, and a firm needs to design its 
organizational interface to suit its own conditions (Brown, 1983). Previous studies have 
pointed out possible elements of an organizational interface. These elements include group 
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meetings (Moenaert and Souder, 1996), liaison personnel (Jansen et al., 2005), Internet-based 
software (Cabigiosu et al., 2015), and procedures for information exchange (Campagnolo and 
Camuffo, 2010). However, the conceptual development of organizational interface is 
incomplete in the literature. We still have limited knowledge regarding the combination of 
elements – the minimum set of elements and the sequence of creating these elements – for an 
organizational interface to be effective. 
For product modularization, an effective organizational interface is critical for 
recombination of organizational units, as it maximizes the opportunities for collaboration and 
communication between all different units (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Jansen et al., 
2009). However, prior studies have not indicated how the combination of elements of an 
organizational interface can contribute to recombination of organizational units. 
One important issue in designing an organizational interface (in terms of protocols) is 
centralization vs. decentralization of power (Brown, 1983; Lei et al., 1996). To design an 
organizational interface achieving high power centralization is mainly to design control 
mechanisms to obtain information from and compliance of lower-level units (Raes et al., 
2011). To design an organizational interface achieving high power decentralization is to 
design self-coordination mechanisms between highly autonomous units, promoting voluntary 
collaboration for self-interests through negotiation, persuasion, and information exchange 
(Wren, 1967). More studies are needed to explore how firms could manage 
centralization-decentralization through leveraging the two mechanisms when designing an 
organizational interface for product modularization. 
2.4. The Context of Multinational R&D 
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R&D of MNCs provides a good context for studying product modularization and the 
organizational interface. MNCs operate in the global context. In many industries, MNCs face 
the challenge of heterogeneous market conditions across countries (Fischer and Behrman, 
1979; Kotler, 1986). Under such conditions, the benefits of designing modular products are 
obvious – MNCs can realize high product variety for different local conditions while 
maintaining low R&D costs due to module sharing (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998; Kar et al., 
2009). 
The dispersion of organizational units is another characteristic of MNCs. Dispersed 
R&D centers are beneficial regarding local knowledge access and market proximity 
(Filippaios et al., 2009; Kurokawa et al., 2007). However, geographic boundaries of 
organizational units of R&D could diminish communication between them and increase 
coordination costs (Haas and Cummings, 2015). Within each R&D center, there are different 
functional units (engineering teams for different components) (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). 
The functional boundary exists due to different tasks of engineering teams/units.  
Multinational R&D could enjoy the benefits of recombination of organizational units 
globally, but realizing such recombination is challenging due to geographic and functional 
boundaries. Also, centralization-decentralization can influence innovation performances of 
MNCs (Chen et al., 2012). Centralization-decentralization can refer to geographic dispersion 
or decision-making power (Chen et al., 2012; Chiesa, 1996; von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 
2002), which is likely to affect product modularization in MNCs. 
3. Research Methods 
The research method is a qualitative, longitudinal, single-case study. We adopted a 
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qualitative method in order to understand the complex phenomenon. Through theoretical 
sampling, a single case can be particularly revealing and thus make contributions to the 
literature (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007). There has been growth in 
interest in dynamic phenomena and process studies (Langley, 1999; Langley et al., 2013; 
Mackay and Chia, 2013; Siggelkow, 2007; van de Ven and Huber, 1990). In process studies, 
theories are developed from qualitative process data comprised of sequences of events or 
actions (Langley, 1999). In this study, we adopt the process study approach, and aim to 
understand how an effective organizational interface has been created over time for product 
modularization. 
Using a theoretical sampling approach, we set the sampling criteria: the MNC (or its 
business unit) should be in an industry with heterogeneous market requirements across 
countries/regions, calling for product modularization at the global level; there is no 
industry-level standard of modularity; the MNC should have globally dispersed R&D and 
each R&D center should commit to serving its local market; the MNC should be successful in 
achieving product modularization (more modules shared globally). Based on these criteria, 
the case of HomeTech (the refrigerator business unit) was selected. 
3.1. Research Setting 
We focused on R&D of the refrigerator business unit of HomeTech – a home appliance 
MNC headquartered in Europe – as the research setting to study the organizational interface 
and product modularization. Meeting our sampling criteria, it provides an ideal and revealing 
setting to answer the research question. Firstly, for refrigerators, there are evident 
heterogeneous requirements across countries and regions that call for product variety. Such 
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heterogeneous requirements include the type, size, style, and regulation of products. For 
example, in North America, side-by-side and French-door refrigerators are the predominant 
types while their sales volumes are very low in Europe. Similarly, bottom-freezer and 
top-freezer refrigerators are very popular in Europe and South America (in bigger sizes), but 
less so in North America. There are clear benefits of pursuing product modularization in this 
industry to achieve product variety with shared modules. 
Secondly, product modularization remains a great challenge in the home appliance 
industry. Unlike the computer industry, where the designs of physical interfaces between 
modules are already well defined by the industrial standards (Baldwin and Clark, 1997), the 
home appliance industry does not have such an industrial standard (Worren et al., 2002). 
Firms define the functions and interfaces of components/modules at the firm level. Very often, 
the physical interfaces need to be changed for innovative product functions and features (Pil 
and Cohen, 2006). 
Thirdly, in HomeTech, there were dispersed R&D centers with different engineering 
habits. The geographic boundaries of organizational units diminished communication and 
collaboration across boundaries. Historically, HomeTech acquired companies with R&D 
centers in different countries. The dispersed R&D centers (in the U.K., Sweden, Italy, 
Germany, Spain, the U.S., and Brazil) had the capability to develop products for the local 
market and they were locally autonomous (i.e. decentralized R&D). Different engineering 
habits formed which made recombination of organizational units difficult. There were also 
functional boundaries within each R&D center, with each unit focusing on different tasks (e.g. 
body development, control board development, condenser development, and compressor 
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development). Recombination of organizational units of R&D at the global level was 
challenging, but could offer great benefits. Therefore, HomeTech needed an effective 
organizational interface to facilitate recombination of organizational units of R&D globally. 
Finally, HomeTech had been successful in product modularization through creating an 
organizational interface to facilitate recombination of organizational units of R&D. Initially, 
the components were specific to local products, so there was no sharing across countries. 
Through three phases of creating an effective organizational interface, HomeTech achieved 
modular product designs at the global level. Over 80% of modules (excluding bodies) were 
interchangeable globally. Product variety was achieved with lower R&D costs. An effective 
organizational interface facilitated recombination of organizational units of R&D in different 
new product development (NPD) projects globally. Fig. 1 shows how HomeTech changed 
from no recombination to low recombination to high recombination of R&D units. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Fig. 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
3.2. Data Collection 
Data were collected mainly through semi-structured interviews, supplemented by on-site 
observation and secondary sources, such as news articles, annual reports, and internal 
documents. The interviewees were involved in R&D activities and/or the change of the R&D 
organization. They included different levels of positions (e.g. executives, R&D managers, and 
engineers), which provided complementary views and mitigated against potential bias. 
During the interviews, we explored how the R&D organization evolved from 1990 to 2016. 
We paid attention to changes in the organization, how the changes created an effective 
organizational interface, and their effects on product modularization at the global level. The 
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main interview topics included: How did the R&D organization change over the years? Why 
was the change done in a certain way? What was the NPD process at different times? How 
did R&D centers communicate/collaborate with each other? How were market requirements 
handled in product development? How did the change contribute to product modularization? 
In total, we conducted 20 in-depth interviews with 14 interviewees employed at the company 
(Table 1 shows a detailed list of the interviewees). Notes were taken during the interviews. 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. We also collected annual reports 
and news articles from 1990 to 2016 and analyzed the changes in the firm’s strategies. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
We adopted the following measures to ensure the quality of the study. Whenever 
possible, we checked company documents, management tools, and other data sources to 
achieve data triangulation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). We also cross-checked the 
responses across interviewees to mitigate against potential bias. We used member check as 
well (Lobo and Whyte, 2017; Nag et al., 2007). On the company site, we did a presentation 
summarizing the information gained and our understanding of the relevant issues and asked 
for feedback. At the end of the study, we wrote a case report detailing the process of creating 
an organizational interface for product modularization in HomeTech and other research 
findings, and then sent it to the company for review and feedback. 
3.3. Data Analysis 
We first described the series of actions in HomeTech and then analyzed these actions 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994) using the ‘temporal bracketing strategy’ (Langley, 1999). 
Overall, we conducted data analysis in three stages which is iterative. First, we constructed a 
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‘thick description’ (Smith, 2014) of the case, detailing what happened in the company and the 
R&D organization in the period from 1990 to 2016. In this stage, we tracked the corporate 
strategy, R&D organizational structure, R&D activities, and product portfolio and identified 
key events or actions. 
Second, we focused on phases and periods of change over time. We conducted an 
analysis with respect to the influence of these events or actions on the organizational interface 
and product modularization. We refined the process of actions focusing on those that are 
related to the organizational interface or product modularization. Then, we identified three 
phases of creating an organizational interface based on discontinuities in the events or actions 
(Langley, 1999). We also discovered how events or actions in one phase influenced those in 
the subsequent phase(s) and found errors, dead-ends, and alternatives along the way. 
Next, we focused on explanations and causality (Miles and Huberman, 1994). We 
analyzed what the three phases mean for an organizational interface, and how they facilitated 
recombination of the R&D units globally. Three elements emerged at this stage (i.e. a 
moderation number of organizational units, a module pool, and architecture leaders). Through 
reviewing the interview data, we analyzed the relationships between the three elements and 
the sequence of creating them. We further analyzed how the element(s) could affect 
recombination in each phase, and identified balancing and brokerage effects of these elements. 
We compared between these effects in order to clarify their differences. In this stage, we went 
back and forth between the data, the findings, and the literature to refine our findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Lok and De Rond, 2013). The field notes, transcripts and other data were 
revisited when new insights emerged (Bresman, 2013). 
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4. Findings: The Process of Creating an Organizational Interface for Product 
Modularization in Home Tech 
Over two and a half decades, HomeTech underwent a process that composed of three 
phases in an effort to create an effective organizational interface for organizational units of 
R&D. These efforts enhanced product modularity overall. The first phase (1992-2009) shows 
concentration of regional R&D resources. The second phase (2009-2012) captures the 
creation of a web-based module pool. The third phase (2012-2016) captures the creation of 
the architecture leader positions to coordinate product development across regions. The three 
phases are related to three elements of the organizational interface. The module pool and 
architecture leaders denote the media or platform for communication. A moderate number of 
organizational units of R&D and relevant policies of module pool and architecture leaders 
denote protocols of using the media or platform. Fig. 2 shows the details of the three 
elements. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Fig. 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
The organizational interface facilitated recombination of organizational units of R&D 
(and thus product modularization) through the balancing effect and the brokerage effect. 
Balancing refers to achieving a balance between centralization and decentralization in terms 
of geographic dispersion and decision making. Brokerage means connecting different parties 
that are otherwise not connected (Fleming and Waguespack, 2007). Table 2 explains in detail 
the effect(s) of each element on enhancing organizational modularity. Detailed findings are 
elaborated next. 
------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
4.1. Phase 1: Regional Concentration of R&D Resources 
In the early 1990s, the R&D centers of HomeTech were widely dispersed and 
autonomous. The first phase of the change was to concentrate the R&D resources in one 
location in each region. This happened in Europe and North America. In South America, 
since the Brazilian R&D center was the only one, there was no need to change. The result 
was that eight R&D centers were reduced to three, one in each geographic region. 
4.1.1. Concentration in Europe and North America 
In Europe, HomeTech owned factories with R&D centers in Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
Germany, and the U.K. The five R&D centers operated autonomously. Each of them had the 
capability to develop a whole product and mainly considered the local market requirements in 
product development. These R&D centers rarely communicated with each other. Each center 
developed its own products without sharing components with the other centers. An R&D 
manager in HomeTech explained the situation with examples: 
The focus of the R&D here was to develop parts for the two factories in Italy. The 
[Italian] R&D was only for Italy … Sweden had a private R&D in the past … They were 
independent. 
Starting from 1992, the Italian R&D center was designated by the company headquarters 
as the regional center for the European market. Then the process began of concentrating R&D 
resources in that center. A product director described the aim as “to put everything under the 
same roof.” Instead of closing the other four R&D centers directly, the company conducted 
the change gradually so as not to disrupt operations. The Italian center became bigger while 
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the other four centers were reduced over the years, as described by an R&D manager in Italy: 
We increased, they reduced, gradually … it was not easy to find people that moved from 
other countries to here easily, so we had [the number of] people growing here, the 
people that stayed there left the company. 
In 2009, the concentration of R&D resources was largely completed in Europe. The 
Italian center became responsible for developing products for the whole of Europe. The other 
four centers lost the capability to develop products. An R&D manager explained their roles: 
They [the other four centers] moved from development to applications [production], so 
they developed, in the past, the drawer, now they are not developing anymore, but they 
are asking to have the drawer from here [Italian R&D]. 
In North America, R&D resources in two independent R&D centers in the U.S. were 
concentrated in one center by the mid-2000s. The process was similar to Europe. 
After regional concentration, three R&D centers (in Italy, the U.S., and Brazil) existed 
globally. Each R&D center focused on serving the regional market by developing the specific 
products needed. These R&D centers did not report to each other and communication was 
rare. 
4.1.2. The Balancing Effect of Regional Concentration 
Upon completion of regional concentration, recombination of organizational units of 
R&D at the global level was not yet realized. However, through regional concentration, an 
important element of the effective organizational interface – a moderate number of 
organizational units developing products for three regions – was formed. This element 
functioned as part of protocols of the organizational interface regarding which organizational 
units could use the module pool and architecture leaders created later. It exerted a balancing 
effect (in terms of geographic centralization and decentralization) contributing to 
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recombination of organizational units of R&D which happened later. This is because 
HomeTech reduced duplication through some degree of geographic centralization while 
maintaining the product variety through some degree of geographic decentralization. 
Before regional concentration, there were eight R&D centers in three regions. High 
geographic decentralization characterized by a large number of organizational units of R&D 
can aggravate duplication (Chen et al., 2012). High duplication could greatly enhance the cost 
of using the module pool and architecture leaders. With eight R&D centers instead of three, 
all eight R&D centers could design modules with different knowledge and habits, causing 
more modules of duplicated efforts in the module pool. A project manager explained how a 
very long list of modules could affect the efficiency of using the module pool (to facilitate 
recombination): 
If there are too many modules there, it can be a distraction, and we would use the 
[module pool] system less when developing products. There is a lot of information for 
each module, and it takes time to understand its technology, features, and versions. 
Therefore, HomeTech conducted regional concentration to reduce duplication. The 
number of R&D centers was reduced from eight to three. Although not yet eliminated, 
duplication was significantly reduced (in the next two phases, duplication was further 
reduced). 
The result of regional concentration was one R&D center in each region, with clear 
responsibilities of developing products for its region. This is because market requirements 
were similar within regions, but very different across regions. Locating an R&D center in 
each region ensured that local market requirements were well attended to. With high 
geographic centralization (e.g. R&D concentrated in one center globally), the product variety 
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(for customers) would be lowered, which could diminish the necessity for recombination. An 
R&D manager explained why HomeTech did not pursue high geographic centralization: 
We need some flexibility … In our industry, there are benefits of having R&D centers 
focusing on local markets, and duplication can be mitigated through international 
collaboration. They [R&D centers in three regions] are committed to serving local 
markets. That drives variety, and that is important for modularization. 
Therefore, a moderate number of organizational units developing for three regions, with 
the balancing effect, became one essential element (as part of protocols) of an effective 
organizational interface. 
4.1.3. Errors, Dead-ends, and Alternatives 
With regional concentration, there was still no recombination of organizational units of 
R&D globally. As a consequence, physical interfaces were not able to be decoupled, so 
product components were not yet interchangeable at the global level. An important reason of 
this is lack of communication across R&D centers. Without communication, organizational 
units could not find collaboration opportunities beyond regions (thus achieving 
recombination globally). HomeTech tried to facilitate cross-border collaboration and a 
telephone list was provided to everybody, but there was still very little communication across 
R&D centers. An R&D manager explained the difficulty: 
We didn’t communicate [at that time] because we are in different regions. Think about it. 
Colleagues are very far away with time difference … Product development is a very 
technical thing, not likely to be crystal clear with one telephone call. 
The company had considered alternatives regarding how to move forward. For example, 
one option was to further concentrate R&D resources in one global R&D center. In 
HomeTech, this was deemed as undesirable both practically and strategically. An R&D 
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manager explained why it was undesirable practically: 
When you centralize [concentrate], you can get some of them [R&D employees], not all, 
this for a company is a problem because you are losing knowledge … the company tried 
to move [people], only [a] few [people] said to move. 
Strategically, global concentration was not desirable due to the importance of 
(centralization-decentralization) balancing of geographic dispersion, as mentioned in section 
4.1.2. 
Another option was to introduce a hierarchy of R&D centers, assign an R&D 
headquarters, and make other two centers report to the R&D headquarters. Again, it is 
strategically undesirable as it would lead to tightly coupled organizational units which were 
likely to develop more integral products (MacCormack et al., 2012) and reduce product 
variety. One executive mentioned: “One of our competitive advantages is being locally 
responsive, and we want to maintain that.” 
Under this situation, HomeTech experienced a dead-end in a sense that the firm was not 
able to further conduct the structural change (in terms of dispersion or power). Therefore, the 
firm needed to shift the focus and create a new element of the organizational interface. Then, 
the company chose to maintain the structure of three R&D centers, but established a 
web-based module pool (as Phase 2) to address the issue of communication for 
recombination. 
4.2. Phase 2: Establishing a Web-based Module Pool 
With R&D resources concentrated at the regional level, in 2009 HomeTech started to 
introduce a web-based module pool. Modules were clearly defined and developed. Relevant 
policies (i.e. protocols of the organizational interface) were also established to manage the 
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use of the pool. 
4.2.1. Defining Modules and Shifting the Mindset 
In 2009, HomeTech started to define modules and then developed the modules for its 
refrigerators. Electronic modules (e.g. the main control boards, power supply boards, and 
user interfaces) and mechanical modules (e.g. compressors, condensers, and chassis) were 
defined. 
The components, such as the control board, existed before but “they were not defined as 
modules previously” according to an R&D manager. Formally defining them as modules 
denoted a change in the mindset that a component was not for a specific product locally but 
for sharing across products globally. Essentially, this was a change of the term from 
“component” to “module” to foster sharing of components globally. The R&D manager noted 
that they defined modules in order to “have really exchangeable modules from one country to 
another.” An engineer noted the changed mindset: “With modularization, we are able to have 
shared knowledge, shared work, and also have as much as possible standardization.” 
Therefore, each module came with detailed documents describing the design parameters and 
physical interfaces, which were helpful for information exchange and module reuse. 
Previously, a control board was designed and used for one product only. 
4.2.2. Creating a Web-based Module Pool 
A web-based module pool (or a module management system) was established in order to 
store and share the developed modules. The module pool could be accessed through 
HomeTech’s encrypted internal network. Every R&D employee had an account and password 
to access the module pool. The R&D centers were required to put any modules they 
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developed into the pool. It contained detailed information about each module, including a bill 
of materials, qualifications, schematics, specifications, and insertion reports. An engineer 
noted: 
We have a system shared globally by VPN [virtual private network] on the servers, and 
you can find the modules developed by them [engineers]. They updated the list with the 
log file, so improvements, with comments. 
This online module pool was built to promote the visibility of any developed modules 
with detailed documents to the three R&D centers so that “everybody that needs [to develop] 
a new product comes and takes [modules for reuse],” according to an R&D manager. 
4.2.3. Policies of Module Use 
As an important part of protocols of the organizational interface, policies were 
established regarding how to use the web-based module pool to develop new products. R&D 
centers could no longer develop new modules at will. In a product development project, the 
new workflow required project managers (focusing on architectural designs for their regions) 
and engineers (focusing on component designs) to check the module pool and reuse any 
modules that were suitable, as stated by an engineer: 
I will show you what the workflow is now … If on the shelf [the module pool], we 
already have valuable modules, means also boards, means the door, that are ready, that 
are fitting the requirements, we use that. 
However, often the modules needed modifications for new products to realize new 
features (and sometimes modifications cannot work, so a new module must be developed; see 
details in section 4.2.5). The engineering team leader who created a module would be 
identified in the pool as the contact person for this module. When the module was needed by 
any one region, he/she would be contacted (through the module pool system) for necessary 
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modifications. An engineer mentioned an example: 
They [a North American team] were managing the board, [the board] started regionally, 
became global [for products] … We asked them to modify the board for our use. 
There was also a requirement for a certain percentage of modules in the pool to be used 
in NPD projects. According to an R&D manager, the policy suggested that a project “has to 
have 80% of the green module [modules from the pool]” for the interior components (i.e. 
excluding bodies) of refrigerators. Any projects below this level would be flagged and 
reviewed by headquarters. 
During the review meeting, project managers and engineers would justify the necessity 
of developing more new modules than expected for successful products. Senior managers in 
headquarters would remain as challengers, but in the end, they would approve projects below 
the 80% threshold if they were well justified. 
4.2.4. The Balancing Effect of the Module Pool 
The web-based module pool with relevant policies/protocols (see section 4.2.3) denotes 
balancing of the decision-making power. Power was to some extent centralized as all R&D 
centers were required to use the module pool in NPD projects as part of the standard 
process/protocols. Another aspect of power centralization was the 80% rule of module 
adoption. In other words, R&D centers could no longer develop any modules at will and they 
must follow protocols set by headquarters. However, there was also the aspect of 
decentralization as the 80% rule could be waived by high-level management in headquarters 
if NPD project managers and engineers could justify the necessity of developing more new 
modules than expected. They still had some freedom. 
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Such power balancing contributed to recombination of R&D units at the global level. 
Prior studies indicate that for highly decentralized R&D, local independence can impede 
coordination across borders (Chen et al., 2012; Gerybadze and Reger, 1999) which is critical 
for decoupling of physical interfaces and module sharing. In HomeTech, high power 
decentralization could lead to each R&D center maintaining the old habits of developing the 
whole products without checking the module pool (nor cooperating with architecture leaders 
later). Therefore, R&D centers could not identify modules to share, and recombination would 
be impossible. An R&D manager explained the tendency of following the old habits: 
So we preferred to use what we already knew, developed in the past, to apply the past 
solutions in the new product … We were not used to going inside the basket to see what 
was available, because [many modules] were different compared to what we did in the 
past. 
Prior studies also indicate that for highly centralized R&D, organizational units are 
tightly coupled, having less motivation to decouple physical interfaces for modular products 
(MacCormack et al., 2012). An organizational interface with rigid control is less likely to 
cause recombination of organizational units due to its emphasis on efficiency (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Gassmann and von Zedwitz, 1999). In HomeTech, high power centralization 
could lead to high-level management simply rejecting/stopping any project proposals below 
the 80% threshold for efficiency, which could block recombination opportunities. Rejecting 
all these project proposals could deprive R&D centers of freedom and flexibility to combine 
modules for local requirements. Therefore, R&D centers would stick to only a few “model 
designs” to pass the 80% rule according to a project manager, undermining recombination 
and innovation. An executive explained: “R&D centers should have some freedom, as they 
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are committed to serving local markets.” 
4.2.5. The Brokerage Effect of the Module Pool 
In this phase, the web-based module pool as an element of the organizational interface 
had some brokerage effect (i.e. connecting otherwise unconnected three R&D centers), but 
the effect was low due to some limitations. 
In HomeTech, the module pool had some brokerage effect as it linked three R&D 
centers (which otherwise cannot be connected) to find opportunities for module sharing, and 
it facilitated recombination of organizational units to some extent. A project manager in Italy 
recalled a project: “On the shelf, we found an interesting module [compressor] developed by 
the U.S. and then the collaboration began.” Through the modules (with detailed documents of 
designs and functions) in the pool, different R&D centers had the information flow to find 
common interests of certain modules to collaborate in NPD projects. An R&D manager said: 
We need a common language, so [there are] different facilities, and the common 
language is the module, because the module is the defined area that we use to deliver 
projects to the other factories. 
However, recombination was lower than expected as shown in Fig. 1(b) because of the 
low brokerage effect of the module pool. This was because, with the module pool, the 
information flow was too late for each module, so that the information exchange was not 
sufficient. The modules in the pool were the completed designs, but the project managers and 
engineers did not have the access to any information in the module design process (which is a 
critical stage for decoupling the physical interfaces) in other R&D centers. 
Each R&D center possessed different knowledge and had different engineering habits, 
which influenced module designs in some way, as an R&D manager noted: 
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If we have a different R&D, we have also different experience, so everybody wants to 
develop in a different way. 
R&D centers did not take into account the requirements in other regions. This reduced 
module compatibility. Sometimes, this cannot even be fixed through late modification. An 
engineer offered an example of the board size in a project: 
North America used to have big boards, and it is very difficult to reduce the size … The 
micro-processor must be smaller, SMD components must be used instead of PTH … It 
did not fit the [board] case in our products. 
However, the module pool was essential for architecture leaders (created later) to 
perform their tasks. An AL mentioned that he needed to “fully leverage the module designs in 
the pool” to complete his tasks. The modules in the pool served as part of their memory 
system to perform the brokerage tasks. With this handy tool, ALs could better utilize existing 
modules when designing the architecture. This tool was also useful when discussing with 
project managers and engineers. 
4.2.6. Errors, Dead-ends, and Alternatives 
With the use of the module pool, module sharing was still far below expectations. It was 
quite common for the projects to fall below the 80% threshold set by the policy. Most of the 
time, as mentioned in section 4.2.4, headquarters had to approve the projects as project 
managers and engineers argued with evidence (such as the board size issue mentioned above) 
that it was not their fault that more new modules had been developed than expected. Many 
modules in the pool were not suitable as their physical interfaces could no longer be properly 
decoupled. 
Regarding how to move forward, HomeTech considered several options. One option was 
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to tighten the rule of 80% as the percentage of modules to use in the pool, and to reject more 
project proposals below that level. However, tightening the rule would break the power 
balance important for recombination, as analyzed in Section 4.2.4. 
Another option was to encourage engineers to communicate across regions when 
developing any modules. However, the engineers did not usually know the right persons to 
talk to. An engineer explained why they opposed to this idea: 
As we didn’t work together at that time, we had no idea whom to talk to. We also had no 
idea what they were doing. 
With nobody responsible for facilitating such communication, the brokerage effect was 
low. Encountering another dead-end (i.e. the firm not able to further enhance modularity 
through this element of the organizational interface), HomeTech decided to move on and 
create a new element of the organizational interface. 
Besides the communication issue, one important issue was that power balancing was not 
achieved for making the architectural/system-level designs. Regional project managers who 
designed the product systems were not assigned global responsibility. An R&D manager 
explained: 
It used to be that project managers in each region had total freedom of designing the 
systems of products … so they designed in different ways with different habits. 
HomeTech figured out that the next step should be to “leverage persons with such 
architectural design capability to bridge the three R&D centers” according to an executive. 
Therefore, HomeTech entered Phase 3. 
4.3. Phase 3: Creating the Architecture Leader Positions 
In 2012, HomeTech created a new kind of positions – architecture leader – with global 
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responsibility for suggesting architectural designs and coordinating NPD of certain types of 
products. ALs, through leveraging the web-based module pool, bridged R&D centers for 
module development and usage. 
4.3.1. Definition and Selection of Architecture Leaders 
HomeTech created AL positions with respect to the different types of products (i.e. 
bottom-freezer, top-freezer, side-by-side, French-door, and single-door). In total, there were 
five architecture leaders based in different regions. However, location did not matter as ALs 
were global positions. They reported to headquarters directly, not to an R&D center. An AL 
mentioned that the purpose of creating the AL position was to “support the execution of 
modularization … while ensuring product variety [at the global level].” ALs had global 
responsibility for coordinating product development for that type by suggesting architectural 
(system-level) designs of new products and connecting different NPD projects in different 
regions for module sharing. As AL was a demanding job, it was specialized in one type of 
refrigerators, but different ALs maintained communication for better module sharing. 
The ALs were chosen based on the expertise of designing specific types of refrigerators 
and a global view. For expertise, ALs needed to have extensive experience as NPD project 
managers who had a system view of products, rather than focused on a component/module. A 
system view was essential for making the architectural designs to connect the three R&D 
centers. An engineer explained the career route to an AL: 
[ALs are] people that started to work in the technology domain, any domain, then they 
started to work on the system, so application engineer [project manager]; they can 
understand from a wide perspective of the products. 
In addition, he/she should be knowledgeable about the functions and designs of modules 
30 
 
in the pool to be able to communicate with NPD project managers and engineers and to 
suggest the system-level designs of products. Sound technical knowledge was essential for 
ALs to have analogic thinking – detecting non-obvious similarities of different problems so 
as to adopt same solutions (Hargadon, 1998). In this way, ALs could find common modules 
to share for different projects in different R&D centers. 
Additionally, ALs should have a global view in order to effectively work with 
colleagues all over the world. An engineer noted: “Architecture leaders, even if sitting here, 
should understand different conditions in different regions.” This global view would be 
important for maintaining a neutral position needed by an AL to earn the trust (Klerkx and 
Leeuwis, 2009), understand different engineering habits, and communicate with different 
R&D centers effectively. 
4.3.2. Responsibilities of Architecture Leaders 
The ALs’ main responsibilities were to make preliminary architectural designs for a 
certain type of refrigerators based on each R&D center’s objectives, discuss the architectural 
designs with NPD project managers and engineers in all R&D centers, and identify module 
sharing opportunities from an early stage of NPD. Being knowledgeable and having a global 
view helped them communicate effectively. ALs of different product types also discussed 
module sharing with each other (details in section 4.3.4). 
The NPD projects were still operated and managed in different regional R&D centers 
due to the heterogeneous market requirements across regions (i.e. R&D centers were serving 
their own regions), but protocols of the organizational interface required them to contact an 
AL before project initiation. ALs linked and coordinated these projects by suggesting 
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architectural designs (i.e. brokerage effect) from an early stage. When making preliminary 
architectural designs, ALs needed to know and respect each R&D center’s objectives. An AL 
expressed how to identify common modules when doing architectural designs: 
Each region has those things that are unique … you have to fit in certain boundaries … 
there will be certain constraints based on the global modular design that we’ll have to 
adhere to. 
ALs also needed to discuss the architectural designs with different R&D centers and 
decide together. An engineer gave an example of how an AL communicated with R&D 
centers: 
He [an AL] is speaking with domain leaders [module engineering team leaders] … 
suggesting proper solutions … North America the system engineer [project manager], 
these are the people that he is able to [get] together to say: ‘Yes, I put that compressor 
together with that power board.’ 
Also, ALs were responsible for NPD projects throughout the whole processes. ALs were 
involved in all relevant projects to ensure the interchangeability of modules. ALs did not 
simply specify the module interfaces at an early stage of NPD, but first identified module 
sharing opportunities, and then gradually decoupled the interfaces in NPD projects through 
discussions with engineers and project managers. ALs were involved in NPD projects for the 
whole processes to ensure well decoupling of physical interfaces. An engineer noted: “We 
keep communication with the architecture leader in our projects to get feedback on the 
module design.” 
4.3.3. The Balancing Effect of Architecture Leaders 
The ALs as an element of the organizational interface had power balancing. As a part of 
protocols of the organizational interface, R&D centers were required to contact an AL before 
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any NPD project was initiated, which reflects some degree of centralization. An R&D 
manager offered an example: “So every R&D center that has a request to have a new 
bottom-mount, they have to call this guy [bottom-freezer AL] …” However, according to 
protocols, ALs needed to decide together with NPD project managers and engineers for the 
system-level designs and module sharing, which reflects some degree of decentralization. An 
AL explained his interaction with R&D centers: 
I make a plan for the architectures [system-level designs] of new products [considering 
projects in all regions], and I present my plan to R&D centers … I discuss with them 
and we may change the plan. 
Power balancing contributed to recombination of organizational units of R&D. ALs 
possessed information of relevant projects in other regions. The requirement to contact an AL 
ensured more module sharing opportunities were spotted early on, as a module may not be 
able to be shared once the design was complete and put in the module pool. Without such a 
requirement, each R&D center could maintain the old habit of developing products without 
discussing with ALs, thus losing the opportunities for module sharing and recombination. 
Regional NPD project managers and engineers still had power in determining the 
function, feature, and modules of the products. This is because ALs with unquestioned 
authority on architectural designs could diminish the flexibility of product designs and 
overlook local requirements. A project manager in the U.S. noted: “We know the local 
market … We have served the North American market for many, many years.” With the 
unquestioned authority of ALs, organizational units of R&D could be more tightly coupled to 
implement the ALs’ designs with less product variety, thus losing many recombination 
opportunities. 
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4.3.4. The Brokerage Effect of Architecture Leaders 
ALs as a critical element of the organizational interface also exerted the brokerage effect, 
contributing to high recombination of organizational units of R&D as shown in Fig. 1(c). ALs 
served as a bridge connecting three R&D centers which were not well connected before. 
ALs, through using the web-based module pool, realized effective early communication 
in module development across R&D centers in different regions, which could not be achieved 
through the module pool alone. As ALs were involved from an early stage of NPD, they were 
aware of all ongoing and potential projects in all regions. ALs were in the best position to 
find opportunities for module sharing through linking projects’ requirements and modules. An 
engineer noted: 
So the architecture leader is the person aware of … capabilities in HomeTech, meaning 
people, skills, and also modules that he can use to build up the appliance. 
ALs made preliminary architectural designs based on each R&D center’s objectives and 
discussed the designs with R&D centers. The preliminary architectural designs contained 
module sharing opportunities across regions (quotes in section 4.3.2). Through discussing 
with R&D centers, ALs decided together with project managers and engineers on 
architectural designs and how modules would be shared (quotes in section 4.3.2), based on 
which organizational units of R&D were recombined for different projects. The architectural 
designs may be modified and discussed again. 
Due to high recombination, modules were developed by different R&D centers within a 
single NPD project. As collaborating organizational units were in different regions, module 
compatibility (interface decoupling) was a challenge. This is because module interfaces could 
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be affected by uncertainty and unexpected problems (Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012), and 
different engineering habits across regions. Another important task of brokerage was to 
facilitate communication across regions in the whole NPD process to ensure physical 
interfaces were well decoupled (i.e. good compatibility of modules). ALs performed this task 
through communicating all regional requirements for the module interface designs. An 
engineer explained: 
The regional inputs are very important … we try to agree with the [other] regions … a 
common solution. 
ALs’ communication was also very helpful for overcoming the challenges of different 
operations, knowledge, and engineering habits across R&D centers. An R&D manager stated: 
… in the past, there were different approaches, and was linked to the region … if the 
top-mount is one [approach from one person], we can achieve really better optimization 
of the module. 
For even better information sharing, ALs of different product types maintained frequent 
communication with each other through regular meetings, as formally required by HomeTech, 
to discuss and find common technical solutions across product types for better module 
sharing. This promoted the transparency of ongoing NPD projects for different product types 
and mitigated the differences in knowledge and engineering habits between these ALs. As a 
result, the modules could even fit different types of products. An R&D manager explained: 
The secret is always to talk, to share … top-mount [AL] talks more with bottom-mount 
[AL], with French-door architecture leader, they can also share solutions. 
6. Discussion 
Through a case study of HomeTech, we examined a process of creating an effective 
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organizational interface for product modularization in the context of multinational R&D with 
no industrial standard on modularity. Our findings contribute to the literature in three ways as 
elaborated next. 
6.1. Mirroring Hypothesis as a Process 
Enlightened by the mirroring hypothesis, we explored product modularization by 
focusing on the relationship between organizations and products. However, most studies of 
the mirroring hypothesis mainly adopted a static view and focused on the mirroring 
relationship without revealing complex organizational dynamics. In contrast, this study 
focuses on the process of mirroring – how products become more modular as organizational 
modularity is gradually enhanced (due to a more effective organizational interface). The 
process denotes significant organizational efforts with errors, dead-ends, and alternatives 
along the way, which were not revealed in prior studies (see Fig. 3 for more details). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Fig. 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
In contrast to the majority of studies of the mirroring hypothesis indicating that products 
design organizations (Hoetker, 2006; Karim, 2006; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996), this study 
shows that organizations can design products. We argue that which relationship holds 
depends on the specific aspect of product designs (a product feature or physical interfaces) in 
question. For the aspect determined by the industry – a feature required by industrial 
standards (Hoetker, 2006) or becoming an industrial trend like a dominant design (Henderson 
and Clark, 1990) – firms need to change organizational designs accordingly to survive or 
become more competitive (so products design organizations). In contrast, for the aspect 
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determined by each firm (e.g. physical interfaces in the home appliance industry, as shown in 
this study), a firm has the freedom to provide a certain feature. The firm will make a certain 
organizational design to produce products with the feature (thus organizations design 
products). Therefore, both relationships may exist for a whole product. However, for 
modularity (or physical interfaces) as one specific aspect of product designs, one relationship 
is predominant. 
Brusoni and Prencipe (2006) conducted a case study of production process technology 
modularization in a tires company. Our findings (about product modularization) are 
consistent with that paper in a sense that the organizational design could influence 
modularization of products or production, and both studies demonstrate a dynamic (process) 
view of modularization. However, our study is different in that it has a geographic dimension 
– we focused on relationships between R&D centers serving different regions and highlighted 
the role of the organizational interface (see section 6.3 for detailed discussion), while Brusoni 
and Prencipe (2006) focused on relationships between different design processes and 
highlighted integration of the organization. 
6.2. The Critical Role of Architecture Leaders 
In this study, we found that ALs played a critical role in product modularization in 
HomeTech, which has not been reported in the modularity/modularization literature. ALs 
bridged organizational units of R&D with different objectives and engineering habits. 
Through the information flow, they helped to identify module sharing opportunities and 
decouple physical interfaces in NPD projects. 
Over time, organizational units of R&D relied less on ALs for bridging cognitive gaps 
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(e.g. different engineering habits/norms) due to learning and changing engineering 
habits/norms. However, their reliance on ALs for bridging information gaps remained 
significant due to heterogeneous market requirements, different technological breakthroughs, 
and the structural holes across three R&D centers. It is also due to the adjustment of physical 
interfaces in the process of module development, which needed to be coordinated by ALs 
who possessed key information. Therefore, over time, ALs’ brokerage role may diminish 
slightly (due to smaller cognitive gaps) but will remain significant (due to constant 
information gaps), which reflects sustained iungens (Obstfeld, 2005). 
Prior studies have analyzed the role of systems integrators in coordinating a network of 
companies in industries (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001, 2011). We found that while both system 
integrators and ALs have coordination roles and extensive system knowledge, they have 
some differences. System integrators have more power than ALs. They can configure the 
network of firms (e.g. removing a supplier) (Brusoni et al., 2001), whereas ALs cannot alter 
organizational units. System integrators exist because, for complex products, firms cannot 
maintain activities and knowledge of all components in-house (Brusoni et al., 2001), but they 
usually design a certain percentage of components in addition to defining the system (Brusoni 
and Prencipe, 2001). ALs were created not to design components, but to help project 
managers to find common modules and offer input to engineers who design components. 
6.3. Organizational Interface 
In this study, we show how multinational R&D created an effective organizational 
interface for product modularization. Prior studies have pointed out different elements of an 
organizational interface (Cabigiosu et al., 2015; Campagnolo and Camuffo, 2010; Jansen et 
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al., 2005; Moenaert and Souder, 1996), but have not sufficiently explored the combination of 
elements in forming an effective organizational interface (the minimum set and the sequence). 
Through studying the combination, we contribute through enriching the concept of 
organizational interface. 
Our findings suggest that for an organizational interface to be effective, a minimum set 
of combined elements is needed. This is because an effective organizational interface must 
have multiple features – efficiency of using (Geyer and Davies, 2000), sufficient information 
exchange (Wren, 1967), and reconciliation of goals and habits through negotiation (Lobo and 
Whyte, 2017; Raes et al., 2011). One single element may not be able to realize all these 
features. Therefore, a firm is likely to need a set of elements to realize these features. In this 
study, three elements were a minimum set to realize these features (for product 
modularization through balancing and brokerage). A feature may require two or more 
elements to achieve and an element may also contribute to two or more features. 
This study indicates that a firm is likely to follow a certain sequence for creating 
elements of an organizational interface for a smooth process. This is because one element 
may serve as the foundation of the other element(s), so that the other element(s) can serve the 
purpose. In other words, one element may influence the other(s), but such influence is likely 
to be one-way. For example, a moderate number of organizational units developing products 
for three regions (element 1) can influence the function of the module pool (element 2), 
making the module pool meaningful, but not the opposite. Without element 1, element 2 can 
hardly serve the purpose of facilitating recombination. With the cost of maintaining element 2 
and no clear effect, it is likely that this element will be removed (causing shifting back). The 
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same is true for element 2 and 3. A firm is likely to follow the sequence based on such 
relationships between elements to have a smooth process and avoid shifting back. 
7. Conclusions 
We show that the multinational R&D organization of HomeTech went through three 
phases to create an effective organizational interface for product modularization – regional 
concentration of R&D resources, establishing a web-based module pool, and creating the 
architecture leader positions. These denote three elements as a minimum set for an effective 
organizational interface. The three elements exerted balancing and brokerage effects, which 
facilitated recombination of organizational units of R&D and modular product designs 
globally. These three elements were created in a certain sequence which shows that one 
element serves as the foundation of the other element(s), which have not been revealed in 
prior studies. 
Our findings could draw implications for managers in multinational R&D organizations. 
To achieve a high level of product modularity for heterogeneous market requirements across 
countries, managers need to create an effective organizational interface for dispersed R&D 
centers. However, the process of creating an effective organizational interface can be 
complicated by issues of the number of elements, the sequence of creating them, and 
unexpected problems. While the trial-and-error approach is inevitable, managers could do the 
following analysis to make the process as smooth as possible. They could first list any 
possible elements which can exert (geographic and power) balancing and/or brokerage effects. 
Then they could map out the relationships between every two elements to determine possible 
sequences of creating the elements. Next, managers could figure out possible paths of the 
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change and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each path. The analysis should be 
iterative. With more information available in the process, managers should repeat the analysis. 
Visual tools may be developed in companies to assist the analysis. 
There are some limitations to this study that could be addressed by future research. This 
study adopted the single-case study approach and examined the organizational interface in a 
specific and revealing context that HomeTech provides. To explore to what extent the 
findings are generalizable, more case studies could be done in different contexts (i.e. different 
firms or industries). Future studies could explore to what extent our findings of the minimum 
set of elements, the sequence of creating them, and the (balancing and brokerage) effects can 
be generalized to different contexts. Besides, we examined a company which had high 
geographic and power decentralization as a starting point. Future studies could also 
investigate companies with high centralization as a starting point to see to what extent our 
findings hold and whether there are different challenges. 
In addition, this study focuses on the role of the R&D department in facilitating product 
modularization. Future studies could explore the role of other functions (such as marketing 
and production) and their influence on product modularization. With the challenges of 
communication between R&D, marketing, and production departments due to different 
objectives and knowledge, it would be interesting to explore how other departments can 
facilitate or hinder product modularization. 
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Table 1 Interviewees at HomeTech 
Interviewee 
No. Position Key Job Responsibility 
Interview 
Duration 
1 Executive (VP 
R&D) 
Managing the global R&D organization, 
developing global R&D strategies, and 
improving R&D efficiency. 
55 min 
2 Project Manager Managing NPD projects and teams, and 
designing product architectures for 
Europe. 
47min 
36min 
3 Project Manager Managing NPD projects and teams, and 
designing product architectures for North 
America. 
42min 
4 Product Director Managing the refrigerator product line 
and developing product strategies for 
Europe. 
1h14min 
5 Executive (VP 
Product Line) 
Managing the refrigerator product line 
and developing product strategies 
globally. 
40 min 
6 Engineer Designing control boards in Italy. 1h38min 
1h24min 
7 R&D Manager Managing a team of control board 
engineers in Italy. 
1h12min 
1h27min 
8 Engineer Designing mechanical components in the 
U.S. 
1h1min 
1h2min 
9 R&D Manager Managing the electronic engineering 
team in Italy. 
56min 
1h11min 
10 R&D Manager Managing the mechanical engineering 
team in the U.S. 
1h32min 
53min 
11 Architecture Leader Managing product architectures and 
coordinating NPD tasks for single-door 
refrigerators globally. 
45min 
12 Architecture Leader Managing product architectures and 
coordinating NPD tasks for side-by-side 
refrigerators globally. 
49min 
13 Engineer Designing user interfaces in Brazil. 37min 
14 R&D Manager Managing the electronic engineering 
team in Brazil. 
1h19min 
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Table 2 The Process of Creating an Organizational Interface in HomeTech: Phases, Elements, and Effects 
Phase Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
The element of the 
organizational 
interface created 
 A moderate number of organizational 
units developing products for three 
regions (Protocols) 
 A web-based module pool (Media/platform 
with protocols) 
 Architecture leaders (Media/platform with 
protocols) 
Effects of the 
element on 
organizational 
modularization 
 Balancing: A moderate number of 
organizational units of R&D with clearly 
defined roles were important for 
recombination of organizational units. 
With high geographic decentralization, 
information exchange across 
organizational units would be inefficient 
due to high duplication; with high 
geographic centralization, the product 
variety would be low, and the necessity 
of recombination would be diminished. 
 Balancing: Power centralization and 
decentralization were balanced. R&D centers 
were asked to use the module pool in NPD 
projects and follow the 80% rule. However, the 
80% rule could be waived subject to approval 
by headquarters. This was to make sure that 
project managers and engineers took full 
consideration of the modules in the pool to 
facilitate recombination, whereas not depriving 
R&D centers of freedom important for 
recombination. 
 Brokerage: Modules in the pool created 
opportunities for R&D centers to spot common 
interests in certain modules and collaborate, 
which was essential for recombination. The 
module pool was also an important tool for 
ALs to perform their tasks. However, the 
module pool in this phase had limitations. Due 
to insufficient information exchange and 
different engineering habits at this stage, the 
brokerage effect was low. 
 Balancing: For each NPD project, R&D 
centers were asked to make decisions together 
with ALs regarding which modules to use and 
develop. ALs conducted system-level designs 
through discussion with R&D centers. With 
certain power, it is easier for ALs to be 
involved in NPD projects to facilitate 
recombination, but ALs did not have 
unquestioned authority in order not to 
overlook local requirements and block 
recombination. 
 Brokerage: ALs had the information of all 
modules, both ones in the pool and ones being 
developed. ALs bridged three R&D centers 
from an early stage of NPD to find common 
interests in modules. ALs, through 
communication, could overcome different 
engineering habits, which further promoted 
module sharing and recombination. The 
brokerage effect was high. 
Organizational 
modularization 
 Recombination of organizational units 
not yet realized. Each of the three R&D 
centers worked independently. 
 Low recombination of organizational units. 
R&D centers started to work with each other, 
but such opportunities were limited. 
 High recombination of organizational units. 
R&D centers worked with each other (via 
ALs’ help) in nearly all projects. 
Product 
modularization 
 Components were non-interchangeable 
at the global level. Although product 
variety was high for the global market, 
the costs were also high. 
 A medium level of modularity was realized. 
Below 40% of all modules (excluding bodies) 
were interchangeable globally. Costs were 
lowered for achieving high product variety for 
the global market. 
 A high level of modularity was realized. Over 
80% of all modules (excluding bodies) were 
interchangeable globally. Costs were further 
lowered for achieving high product variety for 
the global market. 
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Fig. 1 Levels of Recombination of R&D Organizational Units* 
 (a) No Recombination 
 
 (b) Low Recombination 
 
 (c) High Recombination 
 
* Each engineering team is an organizational unit.  
Fig. 2 Elements of an Effective Organizational Interface in HomeTech 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Creating an Effective Organizational Interface for Product Modularization in 
HomeTech R&D: A Conceptual Framework 
 
